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A conditionally anonymous ring signature is an exception since the anonymity is condi-
tional. Specifically, it allows an entity to confirm/refute the signature that he generated
before. A group signature also shares the same property since a group manager can revoke
a signer’s anonymity using the trapdoor information. However, the special node (i.e., group
manager) does not exist in the group in order to satisfy the ad hoc fashion. In this paper,
we construct a new conditionally anonymous ring signature, in which the actual signer can
be traced without the help of the group manager. The big advantage of the confirmation
and disavowal protocols designed by us are non-interactive with constant costs while the
known schemes suffer from the linear cost in termsof the ring sizenor security parameter s.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A ring signature, initiated by Rivest et al. [12], is a primitive that allows a signer to represent a group (called a ring) to sign
a message while remaining unconditionally anonymous in the ring. This unconditional anonymity is not always desirable
as it allows amalicious signer to sign amessage without being responsible for the consequences. A group signature (e.g.,[6])
can avoid this problem as a group manager can revoke the signer identity using a trapdoor. However, the group in a group
signature is fixed from the beginningwhile it is formed in an ad hocmanner and there is no special node (i.e., groupmanager)
in a ring signature scheme.
A conditionally anonymous ring signature was first proposed by Komano et al. [9] (termed as a deniable ring signature).
Under this notion, a signer can represent a ring to sign a message anonymously while the anonymity is conditional: a signer
can confirm the fact of signing through a confirmation protocol and a non-signer can refute the claim of signing through a
disavowal protocol. This model of conditional anonymity is from the undeniable signature by Chaum and van Antwerpen
[5,4], where the signature is not publicly verifiable until a signer confirms that he is the real signer through a confirmation
protocol. Our work is motivated by Komano et al. [9] and tries to propose a more efficient conditionally anonymous ring
signature scheme.
Naor proposed a deniable ring authentication [11], in which a prover P can convince a verifier V that a message m is
from a ring L while P is fully anonymous in L. In addition, V cannot prove to the third party that m is obtained from P .
His scheme is an interactive protocol and the anonymity inherits from the unconditional anonymity of a ring signature.
Wu et al. [13] proposed a new notion of Ad Hoc group signature, which has the same motivation as a conditionally
anonymous ring signature although their model is slightly different. They constructed schemes from the accumulator [2]
and knowledge signature [3]. Liu et al. [10] proposed a revocable ring signature scheme, in which the identity of the actual
signer can be revoked by a set of authorities. Fujisaki [8] proposed a traceable ring signature, where the signer’s identity can
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Table 1
Comparison between [9,13] and our scheme.
p: pairing; e: exponentiation;m: scalar multiplication;
n : ring size; s : security parameter.
Signing Verification Confirm. Disavowal Interac.
[9] (4n− 1)e 4ne (4s)e (4s)e Yes
[13] (n+ 1)e (n+ 2)e (2n+ 10)e (2n+ 10)e No
ours 1p+4e+nm 2p+3e+nm 3p+6e 3p+7e No
be traced only if he conducts a double signing on the same message and ring. Although this is useful in e-voting, it is not a
conditionally anonymous ring signature we are discussing in this paper.
Contribution. Under the security model of Komano et al. [9], we propose a new conditionally anonymous ring signature. Our
scheme is more efficient than [9]. Asymptotically (in ring size n), our signing and verification are respectively 4 times faster
than [9]. Our confirmation and disavowal protocols are both non-interactive and have constant costs while theirs has O(s)
rounds and O(s) exps. Ad hoc group signature [13] has the samemotivation as a conditionally anonymous ring signature. In
their construction, each ring needs to pre-compute a group parameter using n exps. This pre-computation is useful only if
the group changes slowly. This paper considers the general ring signature setting where a ring might dynamically change.
Under this case, the signing/verification algorithm in [13] respectively needs about n exps. Their confirmation/disavowal
protocol (termed as self-traceability protocol in [13]) is also non-interactive but it needs about 2n exps. Their security is
based on a new assumption (called DFDH assumption) while ours is based on standard assumptions: DBDH assumption and
ECDL assumption (see Definitions 1 and 2 for these notions). Detailed comparison is shown in Table 1.
Organization. Section 2 introduces cryptographic hardness assumptions. Section 3 introduces the model of a conditionally
anonymous ring signature. Section 4 proposes a new scheme. Section 5 gives security proofs of our scheme. The last section
is a conclusion.
2. Preliminaries
In this sectionwebriefly introduce bilinearmaps over an elliptic curve andhardness assumptions from it.G1 is an additive
cyclic group over an elliptic curve and G2 is a multiplicative cyclic group. Both of them have a prime order q. P is a random
generator of G1. A bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 is a map satisfying the following:
1. Bilinearity. ∀ P,Q ∈ G1, ∀ a, b ∈ Zq, eˆ(aP, bQ ) = eˆ(P,Q )ab.
2. Non-degeneracy. eˆ(P,Q ) = 1 for some Q ∈ G1\{O} iff P = O.
3. Computability. ∀ P,Q ∈ G1, eˆ(P,Q ) can be computed efficiently.
Definition 1. Decisional Bilinear Diffie--Hellman (DBDH) assumption states that no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversaryD can distinguish (aP, bP, cP, eˆ(P, P)abc) from (aP, bP, cP, R)with non-negligible advantage, where a, b, c ← Zq
and R ← G2.
Definition 2. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (EC-DL) Assumption overG1 states that for any probabilistic polynomial time
adversaryD ,
Pr[D(aP, P,G1) = a : a ← Zq]
is negligible.
3. Model of conditionally anonymous ring signature
We present the model in [9] (termed as ‘‘deniable ring signature’’ there) for a conditionally anonymous ring signature
(we change the name as it seems more intuitive).
3.1. Syntax
As mentioned before, similar to a ring signature, a signer can represent the ring (or group) to sign a message while
remaining anonymous among this ring. However, this anonymity is conditional:when one signed a signature, he can confirm
this through a confirmation protocol; when he did not sign a signature, he can disavow this through a disavowal protocol.
Definition 3. A conditionally anonymous ring signature consists of the following algorithms. Let the universe ofmembers
U = {1, . . . , χ}.
1. A probabilistic key generation algorithmK , given a security parameter s, outputs public and private keys (pki, ski) for
member i.
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2. A probabilistic signing algorithm S, given a message m, a private key skk of signer k, and the public keys pk1, . . . , pkn of
set L = {u1, . . . , un}, outputs a tuple (m, σ , L). For simplicity, we do not distinguish i and its public key pki.
3. A deterministic verification algorithm V , given (m, σ , L), determines whether σ is a valid signature for (m, L).
4. A confirmation protocol C, executed between a signer k and a verifier with a common input (m, L, σ , k). A signer also
inputs his secret key skk. Finally, a verifier either accepts or rejects signer’s confirmation.
5. A disavowal protocolD , executed between a member i ∈ L and verifier with input common (m, σ , L, i). The member i
also has ski as his secret input. Finally, a verifier either accepts or rejects the disavowal of i.
3.2. Oracles
In this subsection, we introduce some oracles utilized in the security model.
signing oracle Osig(i,m, L). It is required that i ∈ L. Upon this query, a ring signature σ on (m, L) using ski is returned.
corruption oracle Ocor(i). The secret key ski of member i is returned.
oracle OC/D(i,m, σ , L). It consists of confirmation oracle and disavowal oracle. For the former, the oracle uses ski to interact
with the adversary to prove that σ is consistent with pki. The adversary either accepts or rejects the proof. A disavowal
oracle is similarly defined.
3.3. Security model
The security of a conditionally anonymous ring signature scheme is formulated in four properties: anonymity, unforge-
ability, traceability and non-frameability. They are now introduced as follows.
Anonymity. The anonymity essentially means that given a signature no one can tell the identity of the actual signer.
Formally, for any distinguisherD , consider the following game (denoted by an anonymity game):
• Initially,D receives pki for all i ∈ U.• D can query oracles Osig , Ocor , OC/D adaptively and receive the answer properly.• D outputs (m, pki0 , pki1 , L) for i0, i1 ∈ L as his challenge. In turn, the challenger takes b ← {0, 1}, uses skib to generate
and return a signature σ on (m, L) toD .
• D can continue to query oracles Osig , Ocor , OC/D , except that he does not request OC/D to confirm that i0 or i1 is/is not
the signer for (m, L, σ ) and that i0 and i1 are uncorrupted.
At the end of game, D generates a guess bit b′ for b. Denote Succanon(D) the success event of D in the game. Define
AdvanonD (s) = | Pr[Succanon(D)] − 12 |.
Definition 4. A ring signature is conditionally anonymous if for any probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher D ,
AdvanonD (s) is negligible in security parameter s.
Unforgeability. A conditionally anonymous ring signature is unforgeable if it is infeasible for any forger to forge a signature
on uncorrupted L. Formally, for any forger F , consider the following game (unforgeability game):
• Initially, F receives pki for all i ∈ U.• F can query oracles Osig , Ocor , OC/D adaptively and receive the answer properly.
At the end of game, F generates a forgery (m∗, L∗, σ ∗). F succeeds if (m∗, L∗, σ ∗) passes the signature verification while
(m∗, L∗)was never queried to Osig oracle and no i ∈ L∗ is corrupted. Denote the success probability of F by Pr[Succuf (F )].
Definition 5. A conditionally anonymous ring signature scheme is unforgeable, if for any probabilistic polynomial time
forger F , Pr[Succuf (F )] is negligible.
Traceability. Traceability essentially means for any consistent ring signature, it is impossible that any member of its ring L
can deny generating it. Formally, for an adversaryA, consider the following game (called traceability game):
• Initially,A receives pki for all i ∈ U.• A can query oracles Osig , Ocor , OC/D adaptively and receive the answer properly.
At the end of game,A outputs a signature (m, σ , L) and plays the role of each j ∈ L to execute the disavowal protocol with
the challenger. A succeeds if the challenger is convinced of the disavowal for all j ∈ L. Pr[Succtr(A)] denote the success
probability ofA.
Definition 6. A conditionally anonymous ring signature scheme is traceable, if for any probabilistic polynomial time
adversaryA, Pr[Succtr(A)] is negligible.
Non-frameability. Non-frameability essentially means that if one did not generate a signature, then he should be able to
prove this using a disavowal protocol. Formally, consider the non-frameability game blow:
• Initially,A receives pki for all i ∈ U.• A can query oracles Osig , Ocor , OC/D adaptively and receives the answer properly.
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At the end of game,A outputs a valid signature (m, σ , L) and uncorrupted j ∈ L such that ( j,m, L)was never queried toOsig
oracle. Then challenger uses skj to execute the disavowal protocol withA.A succeeds if the challenger fails to disavow. Let
Succnf (A) denote the success event ofA.
Definition 7. A conditionally anonymous ring signature is non-frameable if for any probabilistic polynomial time attacker
A, Pr[Succnf (A)] is negligible.
4. Construction
In this section, we introduce our new conditionally anonymous ring signature scheme.
Setup. s ∈ N is a security parameter, groups (G1,+) and (G2,×) are of large prime order q, P is the generator of G1.
eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 is a bilinear map. H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq are two hash functions.
Key Generation. Take ti ← Zq as the private key for member i. Ti = tiP is his public key, where in this paper a ← S means
sampling a random element from set S.
Signing. Given message m and ring L = T1||T2|| · · · ||Tn, signer k ∈ L (when it is clear, we do not distinguish k and Tk) first
generates a partial signature (ρ, r0):
1. Take r0 ← {0, 1}s, compute µ0 = H0(0, r0,m, L), µ1 = H0(1, r0,m, L);
2. Compute ρ = eˆ(µ1, µ0)tk .
Then, signer generates a proof π1 that ρ = eˆ(µ1, µ0)tk holds for some k ∈ Lwithout revealing k. Generically, OR protocol
[7] can do this but it requires a multiple of n pairings, which is very inefficient! In the following, we propose an efficient
approach.
3. Take d, r1 ← Zq, computeM = eˆ(P, P)d, N = eˆ(µ1, µ0)d, R = ρr1 ;
4. Take Ui ← G1 for each i ≠ k, compute hi = H1(m,M,N, R, ρ,Ui);
5. Compute Uk = r1Tk −i≠k(Ui + hiTi − hiTk) and
hk = H1(m,M,N, R, ρ,Uk), e = d− (ni=1 hi + r1)tk.
Finally, let π1=(M,N, R, {Ui}ni=1, e). The full signature is σ = (ρ, r0, π1).
Verification. Upon signature σ = (ρ, r0, π1) and (m, L), parse π1 as π1 = (M,N, R, {Ui}ni=1, e). Verifier does the following
to verify that (ρ, r0) is consistent with (k,m, L) for some k ∈ L.
1. Compute hi = H1(m,M,N, R, ρ,Ui), for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n};
2. Check
M ?= eˆ(P, P)e · eˆ

P,
n
i=1
(Ui + hiTi)

, (1)
N ?= ρ
n
i=1 hi · R · eˆ(µ1, µ0)e. (2)
It accepts if and only if Eqs. (1) (2) both hold.
Completeness. Note
n
i=1(Ui + hiTi) = (r1 +
n
i=1 hi)Tk. Hence, the right side of Eq. (1) is eˆ(P, P)e · eˆ(P, (r1 +
n
i=1 hi)Tk) =
eˆ(P, P)d = M. On the other hand, e+ tk(ni=1 hi + r1) = d. Hence, the right side of Eq. (2)= eˆ(µ1, µ0)e · ρni=1 hi · R = N.
Remark 1. π1 demonstrates the knowledge of tk. Indeed, (M,N, R,m,Ui) is the input to compute hi for each i ∈ L and hence
these variables (also implying d, r1) are fixed before computing hi. Assume the forgery is σ = (ρ, r0,M,N, R, {Ui}ni=1, e).
Let hk be the latest computed variable among {hi}ni=1. If we change hk to h′k (under the random oracle model), then the
forgery will accordingly change to σ ′ = (ρ, r0,M,N, R, {Ui}ni=1, e′) so that hi = h′i for i ≠ k. Using verification in Eqs. (1)
(2) for σ and σ ′, we have that (e − e′) + (hk − h′k)tk = 0 and (e − e′) + (hk − h′k)t = 0, where ρ = eˆ(µ0, µ1)t . Hence,
t = tk = (e′ − e)/(hk − h′k). For anonymity, Eqs. (1) (2) do not leak anything about k as the verification is symmetric on L
and ρ = eˆ(µ0, µ1)tk does not leak k as by DBDH assumption ρ is indistinguishable from being uniformly random in G2.
Confirmation. The actual signer k uses this protocol to prove that the partial ring signature (ρ, r0) is indeed produced by
him w.r.t. (m, L).
1. He takes d′ ← Zq, and computes
M ′ = eˆ(P, P)d′ , N ′ = eˆ(µ1, µ0)d′ , h′k = H1(M ′,N ′, ρ), e′ = d′ − h′k · tk;
2. He sends the proof π2 = (e′,M ′,N ′) to the verifier;
3. Verifier computes h′k = H1(M ′,N ′, ρ);
4. Verifier checks thatM ′ ?= eˆ(P, P)e′ · eˆ(P, Tk)h′k , and N ′ ?= ρh′k · eˆ(µ1, µ0)e′ ;
Verifier accepts if and only if both equations hold.
Disavowal. Upon signature (ρ, r0, π1) on (m, L), a non-signer ℓ ∈ L to prove that he did not generate this signature. To do
this, he proves that ρ is inconsistent with Tℓ:
1. He computes ρℓ = eˆ(µ1, µ0)tℓ and generates a proofπ3 using confirmation protocol proving that Tℓ and ρℓ are consistent
in tℓ. Finally, he sends π3, ρℓ to verifier.
2. Verifier checks ρℓ ≠ ρ and π3 is valid. He accepts iff both hold.
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4.1. Performance
Our signing algorithm needs 1 pairing, 4 exps and n scalar multiplications; verification algorithm needs 2 pairings,
3 exps and n scalar multiplications; confirmation needs 3 pairings and 6 exps; disavowal needs 3 pairings and 7 exps,
where the calculation counts simple strategies (e.g., in signing algorithm, r1Tk +ni=1 hiTk = (r1 +ni=1 hi)Tk costs one
scalar multiplication; eˆ(P, P) is fixed and can be pre-computed). In contrast, for the scheme in [9], signing algorithm costs
(4n − 1) exps; verification algorithm costs 4n exps; confirmation costs 4s exps; disavowal costs 4s exps. It is known that
a scalar multiplication is much faster than a prime field exp under the same parameter size. Hence, asymptotically, our
signing/verification is at least 4 times faster than [9]; Disavowal/confirmation is respectively much faster than theirs. We
notice that their confirmation scheme seemingly can also use Fiat–Shamir transform (hence can be more efficient) but it is
unclear whether such a technique is also applicable to their disavowal protocol as a care must be taken that such a proof
should not give adversary some knowledge to forge a signature w.r.t. an honest user (i.e., framing). In terms of our scheme,
such a caremeansρℓ should not give adversary an advantage to frame an innocent user as a signer of a signaturewho actually
did not sign it at all. In the construction of [13], one needs to first conduct n exps to compute a public group parameter. This
parameter is unlikely to be pre-computable if the ring is dynamically changing. So in this scenario, their signing/verification
should count this cost and hence need about n exps. Similarly, their confirmation/disavowal protocol is also non-interactive
but in this scenario it needs about 2n exps. For the size of the signature, the scheme of [13] generates the signature with
constant size, and the size of signature in [9] and ours are 2n + O(1) field elements. The security in [13] is based on a new
assumption whereas ours is based on standard assumptions. Comparison with [9] and [13] is summarized in Table 1.
5. Security
Anonymity. Our anonymity idea is simple. Eqs. (1) (2) are symmetric on members in L. Further, the partial signature
(ρ, r0) does not leak any information about signer k, due to DBDH assumption. However, the anonymity must be proved
when adversary has access to signing, confirmation/disavowal and corruption oracles. So it needs some care to reduce the
anonymity to the DBDH assumption.
Theorem 1. Our construction is conditionally anonymous under DBDH assumption if H0 and H1 are random oracles.
Proof. AssumeD is a distinguisher who breaks the anonymity with non-negligible advantage. We construct an adversary
B to break the DBDH assumption. Upon a challenge (P, A = aP, B = bP, C = cP, Z), his goal is to distinguish Z = eˆ(P, P)abc
or Z is random inG2.B uses this challenge tuple to simulate an anonymity gamewithD and uses it to distinguish Z . Detailed
simulation follows.
Setup. ForU = {1, 2, . . . , χ},B takes k ← U, and sets the public key Tk = C . For user i ≠ k,B defines Ti = tiP normally by
taking ti ← Zq.B providesD with parameters (q,G1,G2, eˆ, χ, P,H0,H1, {Ti}χi=1).B maintains oracles H0 and H1 as follows.
H0 oracle for a query of form (0,m, r0, L): Bmaintains a list L1 (initially empty). He first checks if (0,m, r0, L)was queried
toH0. If no,B tosses a coin ∈ {0, 1}with Pr[coin = 0] = δ (δ is chosen later).B takes x ← Zq and inserts (0,m, r0, L, x, coin)
into L1. In any case, he extracts a record (0,m, r0, L, x, coin) from L1. If coin = 0, B answers H0(0,m, r0, L)=xP . If coin = 1,
B replies H0(0,m, r0, L)=x(aP) toD .
H0 oracle for a query of form (1,m, r0, L): Bmaintains a list L2 (initially empty). He first checks if (1,m, r0, L)was queried
to H0. If no,B chooses a random value y ∈ Zq, and inserts the tuple (1,m, r0, L, y) into L2. In any case,B can extract a record
(1,m, r0, L, y) from L2.B returns H0(1,m, r0, L) = y(bP).
H0 oracle for a query z of not the above two forms: B maintains a list L3 (initially empty). If z was not queried to H0,B
takes ξ randomly from G2 and inserts (z, ξ) into L3. In any case, he extracts a record (z, ξ) from L3 and replies with ξ .
H1 oracle for query z: B maintains a list L4 (initially empty). Upon a query z, if it was not queried before, then he takes ξ
randomly from Zq and inserts (z, ξ) into L4. In any case, he extracts a record (z, ξ) from L4 and returns ξ .
B answers other oracles queries fromD as follows:
Query on Ocor(i): If i = k,B terminates with Fail; otherwise, normally returns ti.
Query on Osig(i,m, L): Let L = T1∥T2∥ · · · ∥Tn (L ⊆ U). If i ≠ k, B proceeds normally using the signing key ti. If i = k, B
simulates (ρ, r0, π1) as follows:
- ρ: B first takes r0 ← {0, 1}s. The probability that ∃(0,m, r0, L, ·, ·) ∈ L1 is |L1|/2s, which is negligible, ignored.
Thus, B queries (0,m, r0, L) to H0 oracle and let the (new) record for it in L1 is (0,m, r0, L, x, coin). If coin = 1, aborts;
otherwise, he queries (1,m, r0, L) to H0 oracle and assume the record for it in L2 is (1,m, r0, L, y). B computes (ρ, r0) =
(eˆ(µ1, µ0)tk , r0) = (eˆ(y(bP), xP)c, r0) = (eˆ(B, C)xy, r0).
- π1: B simulates the proof π1 as follows:
1. Take d ← Zq, computeM = eˆ(P, P)d, N = eˆ(µ1, µ0)d;
2. Take Ui ← G1, hi ← Zq for each i ∈ L\{k};
3. Take z, hk ← Zq, compute Uk = zP −i≠k Ui −ni=1 hiTi, R = eˆ(µ1,µ0)z
ρ
n
i=1 hi
. (Note: r1 in the signing algorithm is implicitly
fixed here by z with z = (r1 +ni=1 hi)tk. R = eˆ(µ1,µ0)z
ρ
n
i=1 hi
= eˆ(µ1,µ0)(
n
i=1 hi+r1)tk
eˆ(µ1,µ0)
n
i=1 hi ·tk
= ρr1 , consistent with the specification);
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4. Let e = d− z. (By the note above, e = d− (ni=1 hi + r1)tk, consistent with the specification!);
5. For each i, define hi = H1(m,M,N, R, ρ,Ui) and update L4 for this correspondingly. As {Ui}ni=1 are uniformly random in
G1, the probability that (m,M,N, R, ρ,Ui) for some i was queried to H1 is negligible, ignored! Hence, this update for L4
is consistent. Finally, define π1 = (M,N, R, {Ui}ni=1, e).
Finally,B returns the ring signature σ = (ρ, r0, π1) toD .
Query onOC/D: Confirmation. For a partial signature (ρ, r0) by user i ∈ L onm,B needs to simulate the confirmation oracle
to prove that ρ is consistent with Ti. If i ≠ k,B uses ti to do this normally. If i = k,B first extracts a tuple (0,m, r0, L, x, coin)
in L1 (it exists since by definition we only confirm a signature by the simulator which implies that µ0 has been computed
by H0 through L1). If coin = 1,B aborts with failure. Otherwise, it simulates the confirmation oracle as follows:
1. Take e′, h′k ← Zq ;
2. ComputeM ′ = eˆ(P, P)e′ · eˆ(P, Tk)h′k and express it as eˆ(P, P)e′+tkh′k = eˆ(P, P)d′ for a hidden d′ = e′ + tkh′k. Let the record
for definingµ1 in L2 be (1,m, r0, L, y), and computeN ′ = ρh′k · eˆ(µ1, µ0)e′ = ρh′k · eˆ(B, P)xye′ , which also can be expressed
as eˆ(µ1, µ0)e
′+tkh′k = eˆ(µ1, µ0)d′ ;
3. Define h′k = H1(M ′,N ′, ρ) and update L4 for this correspondingly. As e′ is random in Zq, the probability that (M ′,N ′, ρ)
was previously queried to H1, is negligible, ignored! Hence, the update for L4 is consistent.
4. Return the proof π2 = (e′,M ′,N ′).
Disavowal. B simulates member i ∈ L to disavow generating a given ring signature (m, L, ρ0, r0, π1). Using confirmation
oracle, it can be done simply:
1.B computes ρi = eˆ(µ0, µ1)ti (if i = k, computes ρi as in the signing oracle).
2.B simulates π3 as in the confirmation oracle that ρi is consistent with Ti.
3. Finally, send ρi and π3 toD .
Challenge. Now assumeD outputs a messagem∗, ring L∗ and a pair (u, ℓ) as his anonymity challenge. If neither of u or ℓ is
k, aborts; otherwise, assume k = u. ThenB flips a fair coin θ . If θ = 0,B simulates the challenge as follows.
1. ρ0:B takes r∗0 ← Zq, and queries (1,m∗, r∗0 , L) to oracleH0. After this, let the record in L2 for this is (1,m∗, r∗0 , L, y). Then
B queries (0,m∗, r∗0 , L) to H0 oracle. After this, let the record in L1 for this be (0,m∗, r
∗
0 , L, x, coin). If coin = 0, aborts
with failure; otherwise, compute ρ0 = Z xy. Note when Z = eˆ(P, P)abc , ρ0 = eˆ(axP, byP)c = eˆ(µ0, µ1)c = eˆ(µ0, µ1)tk ,
consistent!
2. π01 :B chooses e, r1, {hj}nj=1 ∈ Zq, computes
M = eˆ(P, P)e · eˆ(P, C)
n
j=1 hj+r1 = eˆ(P, P)e+(
n
j=1 hj+r1)tk = eˆ(P, P)d
for a hidden d,N = eˆ(A, B)exy ·Z xy(
n
j=1 hj+r1). When Z = eˆ(P, P)abc ,N = eˆ(µ1, µ0)e+(
n
j=1 hj+r1)c = eˆ(µ1, µ0)d, consistent.
When Z is random, N is random. Then B computes R = ρr1 = Z xyr1 , and for j ≠ k, B chooses Uj ∈ G1, computes
Uk = r1Tk −j≠k(Uj + hjTj) +j≠k hjTk (perfectly simulated). Since {Uj}j∈L∗ (including j = k) are uniformly in Gn1,
the probability that (m∗,M,N, R, ρ0,Uj) was queried H1 before, is negligible (ignore!). Hence, it is consistent to define
hj = H1(m,M,N, R, ρ0,Uj) for j ∈ L∗ and update L4 correspondingly. From our simulation, when Z = eˆ(P, P)abc , the
adversary’s view in this simulation is according to the real distribution.
If θ = 1,B computes member ℓ’s ring signature (ρ1, π11 ) using tℓ normally. In any case,B provides (ρθ , π θ1 ) toD .
Guess. AssumeD outputs a guess bit θ ′ for θ. If θ = θ ′,B guesses Z is eˆ(P, P)abc ; otherwise,B guesses Z is random.
Analysis.We first assume that the abortion event does not occur in the simulation. In the realworld, assumeD has advantage
AdvanonD = ϵD to distinguish the members k and ℓ. When θ = 1, since Z is not used in the simulator, the success probability
ofB is exactly 1/2. In the case of θ = 0, the success probability ofB is Pr[θ = θ ′ = 0 ∧ (Z = eˆ(P, P)abc)] + Pr[θ = 0, θ ′ =
1 ∧ (Z =′′ random′′)]. Note Pr[Z = eˆ(P, P)abc] = Pr[Z =′′ random′′] = 1/2. And also note that when Z = eˆ(P, P)abc , the
adversary’s view is identical to the real anonymity game. Hence, the first part is 1/2(1/2+ ϵD). On the other hand, when Z
is random, (ρ0, π01 ) is independent of the signer identity. Hence, the second part =1/4. Combining all the cases together, we
have that the success probability ofB is 1/2+ 1/2ϵD, contradiction to DBDH assumption.
Our analysis is based on the assumption that no abortion event occurs. However, there are three types of abortion events:
(1) the chosen anonymity pair byD does not contain member k. This abort ion does not occur with probability 1/χ; (2) for
H0 oracle, it will not abort only if the coin in the challenge simulation is coin = 1, and for other cases coin = 0. This occurs
with probability 1/χ · δqH0 (1− δ), where qH0 is the number of H0 queries. This value is maximized at δopt = qH0/(qH0 + 1);
(3) whenmember k is corrupted, abortion event occurs. However, when this occurs, it is impossible forD to choose k as the
test member because the definition requires thatD cannot queryOcor for the test members. Hence, conditional on abortion
event in (1) will not occur, this case does not occur too. Summarizing the cases, we conclude the probability that B can
solve DBDH problem is at least 12 + ϵD2eχ2(qH0+1) (here e is the base of the natural logarithm), which is non-negligibly better
than 1/2. 
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Unforgeability.We consider the unforgeability of our scheme. The basic idea is outlined in Remark 1.We give a formal proof
in this section, where we will use Forking Lemma [1]. It essentially means that if an attacker breaks a system with a good
probability, then when we rewind this attacker, it will succeed with a related result. In our system, these related results will
allow us to extract the system secret that allows us to solve the ECDL problem, contradicting the ECDL assumption. Here is
the Forking Lemma [1].
Lemma 1 (Forking Lemma [1]). Fix q ≥ 1. Let a set H have size h ≥ 2. Let A be a randomized algorithm that on input
x, γ1, . . . , γq returns a pair (I, σ ) where x is sampled by an algorithm IG, γi ∈ H, I ∈ {0, . . . , q} and σ ∈ {0, 1}∗. acc is
denoted as the accepting probability of A, which is defined as the probability that I ≥ 1. Then the forking algorithm FA for A is a
randomized algorithm below with input x from IG:
Algorithm FA(x)
Pick coins ρ for A at random
γ1, . . . , γq ← H
(I, σ )← A(x, γ1, . . . , γq; ρ); If I = 0 then return (0, ε, ε)
γ ′I , . . . , γ ′q ← H
(I ′, σ ′)← A(x, γ1, . . . , γI−1, γ ′I , . . . , γ ′q; ρ)
If (I = I ′) and (γI ≠ γ ′I ) then return (1, σ , σ ′), else return (0, ε, ε)
Let frk = Pr[b = 1 : x ← IG; (b, σ , σ ′)← FA(x)], then frk ≥ acc · ( accq − 1h ).
Theorem 2. Our construction is unforgeable under ECDL assumption if H0 and H1 are random oracles.
Proof. Assume F is a forger with non-negligible success probability. We construct an adversary B to break ECDL
assumption. Given a challenge (P, C = cP),B needs to compute c .B constructs an algorithmAwith input (P, cP) (Awill be
used in the Forking Lemma).A choosesmember k fromU randomly, and sets the public key ofmember k as Tk = C . For user
i ≠ k,A defines Ti normally by taking ti randomly from Zq.A providesF with parameters (q,G1,G2, eˆ, P,H0,H1, χ, {Ti}χi=1).
A runs F against the unforgeability game and answers his oracle queries as follows.
H0-query z:Amaintains a list L1 (initially empty). He first checks if z was queried to H0. If no,A takes ξ ← Zq, and inserts
the tuple (z, ξ) into L1. In any case,A extracts a record (z, ξ) from L1 and returns H0(z) = ξP .
B answers queries H1(z) and Ocor(i) as described in the Theorem 1.
Query on Osig(i,m, L): Let L = T1 ∥ T2 ∥ · · · ∥ Tn (L ⊆ U). If i ≠ k, A proceeds normally as he knows the secret key ti. If
i = k,A simulates ρ, r0, π1 as follows:
(ρ, r0): Take r0 ← Zq. For a = 0, 1, let µa = H0(a,m, r0, L) = ξaP using the record in L1. Then A computes
ρ = eˆ(µ1, µ0)tk = eˆ(ξ1P, ξ0P)tk = eˆ(P, C)ξ0ξ1 .
π1:A simulates the proof π1 as described in Theorem 1 (without using tk).
Finally,A returns σ = (ρ, r0, π1) to F .
Query onOC/D: The simulation exactly follows that in Theorem 1. Notice that abortion event there occurs only ifH0(input)
is not xP for a known x (i.e., case coin = 1). Here no abortion occurs asH0(input) is always xP for a known x. Disavowal oracle
can straightforward use the confirmation oracle.
Finally, F outputs a forged proof π∗1 = (M∗,N∗, R∗, {U∗i }ni=1, e∗) on its chosen message m∗ and ring L∗. If F ’s forgery is
valid and k ∈ L∗,A returns ω∗ = (m∗, L∗, ρ∗, r∗0 ,M∗,N∗, R∗, {U∗i }ni=1, e∗). Note thatA accepts only if ρ∗ is consistent with
Tk (note that he can verify this himself by checking that ρ ≠ eˆ(µ0, µ1)ti for all i ∈ L∗\{k} using ti (known)).We claim that the
accepting probability acc ofA is 1
χ
ϵF . Before abortion, the view of F is real. This implies that k is the forgery signer identity
with probability 1/χ . Further, the forgery by member k with probability ϵF/χ . On the other hand, when k is corrupted, a
forgery is illegal for k ∈ L. Hence, the accepting probability acc ofA is still: acc = 1
χ
ϵF .
This completes the description of A. Now consider B who wants to solve ECDLP. On input Tk = C , B runs the forking
algorithm FA(C) (with advantage frk) twice to return I∗, ω∗ for ω∗ = (m∗, L∗, ρ∗, r∗0 ,M∗,N∗, R∗, {U∗i }, e∗) and I ′, ω′ for
ω′ = (m′, L′, ρ ′, r ′0,M ′,N ′, R′, {U ′i }, e′). H defined in FA(x) code of Forking Lemma is H1 here. Define I∗ (resp. I ′) to be
the index of random outputs by H1 such that γI∗ (resp. γ ′I ′ ) is used to define the final hi in computing ω
∗ (reps. ω′). If
I∗ = I ′, then prior to receiving γI∗ and γ ′I ′ , the whole randomness for computing ω∗ and ω′ are identical. Hence, in this
case,m∗ = m′, L∗ = L′,M∗ = M ′,N∗ = N ′, R∗ = R′, ρ∗ = ρ ′ (as they are the H1 query input to obtain γI∗ (respectively γ ′I ′ ))
and U∗i = U ′i for each i ∈ L∗ = L′ (each appears in the input for computing hi and must occur before γI∗ or γ ′I ′ is received).
Assume γI∗ (resp. γ ′I ′ ) is used to define h
∗
i0
(resp. h′i0 ) for i0 ∈ L∗ = L′. Then,
M∗
eˆ(P, P)e∗
= eˆ

P,
n
i=1
(U∗i + h∗i Ti)

and
M ′
eˆ (P, P)e
′ = eˆ

P,
n′
i=1
(U ′i + h′iTi)

.
From this, we have eˆ(P, P)e
∗−e′ = eˆ(P, (h′i0 − h∗i0)Ti0). (e∗− e′)+ (h∗i0 − h′i0)ti0 = 0. Similarly, (ρ∗)
n
i=1 h∗i · R∗ · eˆ(µ1, µ0)e∗ =
(ρ∗)
n
i=1 h′i · R′ · eˆ(µ1, µ0)e′ ,which gives (e∗ − e′)+ (h∗i0 − h′i0)tk = 0. Hence i0 = k and tk = ti0 = (e∗ − e′)(h′k − h∗k)−1. By
Forking Lemma, the success probability of B is ϵB ≥ frk ≥ acc2qH1 −
1
2s ≥
ϵ2F
χ2·qH1
− 12s , which is non-negligible, contradicting
the ECDL assumption. 
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Traceability.We need to show that there does not exist an attacker, who comes up with a signature (σ = (ρ, r0, π1),m, L)
such that every j ∈ L can disavow (i.e., no one can be traced). Our idea is that when the signature is consistent, ρ must
be consistent with Tk for some k ∈ L. This can be shown by applying Forking Lemma and using Eqs. (1) (2). Then, for a
consistent k to disavow, he must generate some ρℓ (different from ρ = eˆ(µ0, µ1)tk ) and prove it is consistent with Tk using
the confirmation protocol. This is impossible as the soundness error of this protocol is negligible, which can be shown using
Forking Lemma and verification equations for N ′ andM ′.
Theorem 3. Our construction is traceable if H0 and H1 are random oracles.
Proof. Let the conclusion be violated by adversary D non-negligibly. Thus, after querying Osig , Ocor and OC/D oracles, he
can output ω∗ which has a format ω∗ = (m∗, L∗, ρ∗, r∗0 , π∗1 ) such that he can represent each j ∈ L∗ to successfully disavow.
Using Forking Lemma, we show that this is impossible. This proceeds in two steps.
• ρ∗ must be consistent with Tk for some k ∈ L∗. We construct an algorithm A for Forking Lemma as follows.
A sets up the signature system normally by taking ti ← Zq for i ∈ U and runs D against it. Let H in Forking
Lemma be H1. Finally, when D outputs a signature tuple ω∗, A outputs (I∗, ω∗), where I∗ is the index of γI∗ by H1
used to define the final h∗i in ω∗. By applying Forking Algorithm FA twice, we obtain two tuples (I∗, ω∗) and (I ′, ω′). Let
ω∗ = (m∗, L∗, ρ∗, r∗0 ,M∗,N∗, R∗, {U∗i }, e∗) and ω′ = (m′, L′, ρ ′, r ′0,M ′,N ′, R′, {U ′i }, e′). Assume γI∗ (resp. γ ′I ′ ) is used to
define hk (resp. h′k′ ). If I
∗ = I ′, then prior to γI∗ (resp. γ ′I ′) the randomness in the two executions are identical. Hence,
m∗ = m′, L∗ = L′,M∗ = M ′,N∗ = N ′, R∗ = R′, ρ∗ = ρ ′ (they are the input to obtain γI∗ or γ ′I ′ ). U∗i = U ′i for each i ∈ L∗ = L′
(each is the input to compute hi andmust occur before γI∗ or γ ′I ′ is received) and k = k′. From verification forM∗(= M ′) and
N∗(= N ′) in Eqs. (1) (2), we have that eˆ(P, P)e∗ · eˆ(P,i≠k(U∗i + h∗i Ti)+ h∗kTk) = eˆ(P, P)e′ · eˆ(P,i≠k(U∗i + h∗i Ti)+ h′kTk)
and
(ρ∗)
n
i=1 h∗i · R∗ · eˆ(µ1, µ0)e∗ = (ρ∗)
n
i=1 h′i · R′ · eˆ(µ1, µ0)e′ .
This gives (e∗ − e′) + (h∗k − h′k)tk = 0 and (e∗ − e′) + (h∗k − h′k)t = 0, where ρ∗ = eˆ(µ1, µ0)t . Hence t = tk and ρ∗ is
consistent with Tk.
• if ρ∗ is consistent with Tk, then k cannot disavow. Otherwise, k can output ρℓ ≠ eˆ(µ0, µ1)tk and pass the confirmation
protocol. This is impossible by similarly using Forking Algorithmwith forking on hk in the confirmation protocol. That is, we
obtain two prover outputs: (e′1,M
′
1,N
′
1) and (e
′
2,M
′
2,N
′
2). From the verification,
eˆ(P, P)e
′
1 eˆ(P, Tk)
h′k,1 = eˆ(P, P)e′2 eˆ(P, Tk)h′k,2 ,
ρ
h′k,1
ℓ eˆ(µ0, µ1)
e′1 = ρh
′
k,2
ℓ eˆ(µ0, µ1)
e′2 .
Thus, e′1 − e′2 + (h′k,1 − h′k,2)tk = 0 and e′1 − e′2 + (h′k,1 − h′k,2)t = 0, where ρℓ = eˆ(µ0, µ1)t . Hence, t = tk. That is,
ρℓ = (µ0, µ1)tk , contradiction. So D cannot disavow with ρℓ ≠ eˆ(µ0, µ1)tk . By the conclusion in the previous step, the
proof is completed. 
Non-frameability. Non-frameability essentially states that the adversary cannot generate a signature such that an honest
member did not sign it while he cannot disavow. Our proof idea is that if the signature is consistent, then using Forking
Lemma, we can show that ρ = eˆ(µ0, µ1)tk for some k ∈ L. If k is uncorrupted and did not sign the signature, then we can
reduce the attacker to breaking ECDL assumption. The proof still uses Forking Lemma. Details follow.
Theorem 4. Our construction is non-frameable if H0 and H1 are random oracles and ECDL assumption holds.
Proof. Assume adversaryF ′ breaks the non-frameability. Then, with non-negligible probability, after querying oraclesOsig ,
Ocor ,OC/D , he can come up a signature σ ∗ = (m∗, L∗, ρ∗, r∗0 , π∗1 ) such that some uncorrupted k ∈ L∗ cannot disavow
successfully. By Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 3, ρ∗ = eˆ(µ0, µ1)tk for some k ∈ L in the traceability model. As queries
of type Osig ,Ocor ,OC/D in non-frameability model are allowed in the traceability model, it follows that this statement also
holds in the non-frameability model. We show that this can be reduced to the ECDL assumption. Given a ECDL challenge
tuple (C = cP, P), a ECDL solver S does the following. We first clarify the difference betweenF ′ here and the forgerF in an
unforgeability game. By our analysis, F ′ needs to forge a signature σ ∗ such that ρ∗ is consistent with some Tk ∈ L∗. Again
as all oracle queries in the unforgeability model is allowed in the traceability model, it follows that by Step 1 in the proof of
Theorem 3, a valid signature σ ∗ in the unforgeability game implies that ρ∗ is consistent with some Tk ∈ L∗ too. Hence, ρ∗ by
F ′ and F is consistent with some Tk. However, the difference is that for F ′, users in L∗ other than k can be corrupted while
forF all users in L∗ must be uncorrupted. Nowwe return to describe S. S constructsA exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2,
except using F ′ to replace F (especially, he takes k ← U and Tk = C and follows F ). Finally, he runs the forking algorithm
using A to output (I∗, ω∗) and (I ′, ω′). Let ω∗ = (m∗, L∗, ρ∗, r∗0 , e∗2,M∗2 ,N∗2 ) and ω′ = (m′, L′, ρ ′, r ′0e′2,M ′2,N ′2). Following
the same steps in Theorem 2, we can compute tk which is consistent with ρ∗ and Tk, contradicting the ECDL assumption. 
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a conditionally anonymous ring signature scheme. Unlike the traditional ring signature, this
anonymity of the signer is conditional: when one signed the signature, he can confirm this through a confirmation protocol;
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he also can disavow through a disavowal protocol if he was not the signer of a signature. Our protocol is more efficient than
previous protocols and is secure under standard assumptions in the random oracle model. Our confirmation protocol and
disavowal protocol are non-interactive.
The conditionally anonymous ring signature scheme proposed in this paper is only secure under the random oracle
models, in which we must suppose the output of the hash function is random. Thus, an immediate problem is to construct
such scheme without random oracles. This is our future direction.
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